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Introduction

Tectonic shifts in the global economy have come to dominate today’s
public discussions on international politics.1 The two largest changes are
the rise of the large emerging economies, often narrowly deﬁned as the
BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), and, thanks in part to this rise,
the potential loss of US hegemony. Indeed, at the time of the writing of
this book, due to the rapid economic ascent of the emerging market
economies, as well as US military (mis)adventures in Iraq and
Afghanistan, both scholarly and public deliberations have increasingly
turned away from the discussion of “US unipolarity” to assessing whether
the multilateral order the US actors and their allies crafted at the end of
World War II is resistant and ﬂexible enough to survive the rising states.2
At the end of the Cold War, scholars were racing to ﬁnd the right phrase to
mark the unprecedented world where the USA would stand alone as a
superpower (“the end of history” versus the “clash of civilizations,” for
instance).3
Today scholarly and public discussions are instead trying to understand the implications of the rise of the BRICs and other emerging
economies for the multilateral order, including its institutions such as
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Since their
inception near the end of the war, a handful of rich countries led by the
USA have dominated these multilateral economic institutions. Although
this asymmetric control over the institutions has long been controversial,
it has become even more contentious as large emerging markets
have increased their importance for global trade and ﬁnancial ﬂows
over the past several decades, while the governance of the institutions
has remained largely static, with the exception of some changes in
1

2
3

For recent scholarly works on this topic, see, e.g., Beeson (2009); Hurrell (2008); Kahler
(2013); Layne (2009 and 2012); MacDonald and Parent (2011); Schweller and Pu
(2011).
See, for instance, Brooks and Wohlforth (2009); Chin (2010); Ikenberry (2008);
Ikenberry and Wright (2008); Mearsheimer (2001).
Fukuyama (1992) (“the end of history”); Huntington (1993) (“the clash of civilizations”).

1
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2008–2010. In this context, questions about whether there is a “crisis” in
the US-crafted multilateral order and whether this multilateral system
will be able to continue to integrate the rising states, as opposed to being
challenged by them, infuse public and scholarly discussions.4 These
discussions have only intensiﬁed with the 2008 global ﬁnancial and
economic crisis since this crisis emanated, unlike earlier crises of the
late twentieth century, not from the developing world, but from the
most advanced ﬁnancial system in the world – the USA.
Underlying these various considerations is a question about the
relationship between economic power and political power. Ultimately,
questions about China’s economic rise, for instance, hinge upon the
extent to which China translates such economic power into political
inﬂuence in the international order. Similarly, debates about the US-led
multilateral political-economic order need to ultimately address the
question of how the rising powers’ economic prowess will affect governance through multilateral institutions. Undoubtedly, this is a multifaceted topic that scholars have approached from different angles,
exploring for instance whether China is a “revisionist” state, whether
the USA retains the legitimacy to revamp the existing multilateral
economic institutions, or the extent to which the rising states would like
to reform prevalent institutional rules. Yet, less has been said about
the fundamental issue that forms the common thread in these various
discussions: the association between economic power and states’ political
power in multilateral institutions.
This book examines this crucial issue by asking the following question:
What is the relationship between states’ economic power and their formal
political power in multilateral economic institutions? This question raises
others: Why do we see the same states possess different levels of formal
political power in different multilateral economic institutions of the same
era? For instance, when the USA and its allies created the IMF and the
World Bank, they endowed these institutions with weighted voting,
namely asymmetric representation of the member states, but they created
the world trade organization of the time, the International Trade
Organization (ITO), with equal voting. What explains this variation in
members’ formal political power across different institutions? Further,
the IMF and the World Bank underwent shifts in members’ formal
political power in 2008–2010.5 Contemporary accounts of these shifts
have been lumped together and riddled with normative assessments (for
4
5

Birdsall and Fukuyama (2011); Kahler (2013); Odell (2009); Voeten (2004).
Voting in both institutions consists of two components – basic votes, which are distributed
to member states equally, and quota (IMF) or subscription (World Bank) votes, which
indicate the member’s shares in the organization, which are in turn calculated by the
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instance, while some considered the rising states to have increased their
formal signiﬁcance in the institution signiﬁcantly, others have dismissed
the changes as tangential). Yet, as this book shows, the 2008–2010
changes in these institutions enhanced the representation of the economically rising states at differing degrees: states, such as Brazil, China, and
India, were able to translate their increasing economic power into greater
formal political power relatively more in the IMF, but they were not as
successful in the World Bank. Again, what explains the differences across
the two institutions?6
Although the discipline of International Relations has long wrestled
with the association between states’ economic power and their political
power within multilateral institutions, it still does not provide clear
answers to these questions.7 On one hand, power-based accounts of
various kinds suggest that multilateral institutions will reﬂect the shifts
in the underlying distribution of economic power, particularly the rise of
certain states (e.g., Brooks and Wohlforth 2009; Gilpin 1981; Kirshner
2010; Layne 2012, p. 211; Schweller and Priess 1997). Robert Gilpin in
his inﬂuential 1981 book War and Change has now famously argued that
as the distribution of power changes, the rising states will fashion the
international system, including its institutions, in accordance with their
interests. Recent power-based perspectives not just rearticulate the
notion that economic power and political power in institutions go hand
in hand, but they also marvel at the gap between the two, namely while the
distribution of economic power in the world has changed, the global
institutions have not caught up with this change. Here, Brooks and
Wohlforth (2009, p. 49) put it succinctly: “no one sitting down to design
the perfect global framework for the twenty-ﬁrst century would come up
with anything like the current one . . . The existing architecture is a relic of
preoccupations and power relationships of the middle of the last century.” The authors emphasize that when these institutions were created at

6

7

member’s relative economic weight and other economic variables. The latter component
is more important in determining a member state’s total voting power.
Throughout the book, I use the G20 as a reference point for the large advanced economies
that are on a relative basis economically declining, but nonetheless remain institutionally
dominant (“the declining states”) and the large emerging markets, which are the economically rising states (“rising states”). The book examines three different categories of states
in discussing the low-income countries: (1) The Sub-Saharan African states (minus South
Africa); (2) the UN classiﬁcation of Least Developed Countries (LDCs); (3) the World
Bank’s classiﬁcation of low-income countries.
As Simmons and Martin (2002, p. 194) deﬁne, institutions denote implicit or explicit and
effective or ineffective rules governing international behavior. The usage of the term
institution here, as elsewhere in the discipline of International Relations, is broad and
includes both formal and informal institutions (Koremenos et al. 2001a, 2001b; Simmons
and Martin 2002).
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the end of the war, they manifested the then distribution of power and
because that distribution has changed today, these institutions are out of
synch with the times. Overall, power-based perspectives suggest institutions (should) reﬂect the asymmetries in inter-state power.8
Yet, other perspectives disagree with this predominantly power-based
analysis of the relationship between states’ economic power and their
formal political power in institutions. Randall Stone (2011, p. 18) emphasizes that weak states tend to receive “a share of formal power that is out of
proportion to their resources” in multilateral economic institutions, so as
to encourage their participation in these rules-based frameworks that the
powerful states otherwise dominate. Stone’s argument, thus, suggests
that the relatively weak (judged by relative economic standing) will possess more formal political power in institutions than we might expect
them to do just based on their importance to the global economy. In a
different theoretical and empirical context, John Ikenberry (2000) makes
a similar argument. He explains that in order to establish long-lasting
institutional arrangements, just as the USA prudently did at the end of the
war, powerful states signal “restraint” within multilateral institutions.
Restraint means the dominant states do not grab all the political power
they can, but rather agree to terms in institutions that do not necessarily
mirror their economic and military resources. Both Stone and Ikenberry
suggest that the distribution of inter-state economic power would not be
reﬂected in institutions as asymmetries in members’ formal political
power; rather, the leading states would voluntarily tame these asymmetries (for different reasons).
These inﬂuential perspectives offer opposing processes, but the same
outcome for how the distribution of formal political power in institutions
will change when some states increase their economic (and military)
power.9 From the relatively more power-based approach, because institutions risk being relegated to the dustbin of history if they fail to update
themselves with the changing distribution of power, the American actors
should realize the unpalatable future for the existing multilateral
8

9

Here and elsewhere, I do not use the term asymmetry in a normatively loaded manner – I
do not suggest symmetry is desirable, nor asymmetry is undesirable. Rather, it simply
provides another way for me to refer to a distribution of power, where some states have
more than others.
Economic power denotes economic resources, which can be assessed with reliance on
widely accepted indicators, including the size of a state’s economy, its record of economic
growth, its participation in international trade relations (through imports and exports),
and its participation in ﬁnancial transactions (either as a recipient of investment or a
source of it). The early debates between realists and liberals (e.g., Keohane and Nye 1977)
regarding the importance of military versus economic power have lost prominence over
time, as important realist approaches have focused solely on economic power (e.g.,
Drezner 2007; Grieco 1990; Krasner 1985; Viner 1948).
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institutions (that they have created and dominated) and update them to
reﬂect the changed and changing inter-state power relations. From the
more institutionalist perspective, the US actors might realize that the
continuation of these institutions, and their acceptability to a range of
shareholders and stakeholders, demands the recognition of others’ power
and the continued signaling of “restraint.” Once again, the outcome
would be the Americans and their allies agree to enhance the formal
political power of the rising states within the institutions.
From an even more intensely institutionalist perspective, one that sees
multilateral institutions as solutions to collective action problems,
through the provision of better information and hence the strengthening
of monitoring and enforcement, how the distribution of economic power
relates to the institutional setting remains unclear. As Robert Keohane’s
(1984) seminal work has argued, and the work following it has suggested,
institutions are there to sustain cooperation “after hegemony,” or at the
very least despite the vagaries in the hegemon’s inﬂuence. Based on this
kind of an institutionalist perspective, institutions isolate the effects of
power and create stable sites for interaction.10 Yet, such an approach does
not tell us enough about how institutions fare when the distribution of
power shifts.
This book contends that existing approaches leave out key aspects of
the relationship between economic power and formal political power in
multilateral economic institutions. Importantly, while existing works
focus on either power or institutions as distinct realms, we must examine
their intersection as well.11
As the preceding synopsis of the literature reveals, there are three
crucial (inter-related though distinct) issues that the existing perspectives
overlook. First, the prevailing literatures do not focus adequately on the
differences across institutions (of the same period) as to how the distribution of economic power manifests itself in the institutions. Going back to
my earlier point, why did the institutional settings of the IMF and the
World Bank, even though they are the twin international ﬁnancial institutions in the literature, address the rise of large emerging economies
differently in the 2008–2010 changes to members’ formal political
power? This variation is key to understanding how the rising states affect
the multilateral order. It is also crucial to unpacking exactly how institutional settings interfere with power dynamics because without explaining
how the distribution of power manifests itself differently across different
10
11

Lake (1993, p. 465) notes that Keohane “goes further to suggest that states may be able to
construct regimes to facilitate cooperation even in the absence of a single leader.”
While Stone (2011) is an exception here, his work focuses on “informal governance.”
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multilateral institutions, one cannot begin to tell a story regarding the
importance of institutions in impacting power dynamics.
Second, based on the literature it is puzzling as to why there is a “lag”
between the changes in the distribution of economic power and the
distribution of political power in multilateral economic institutions
(e.g., the Brooks and Wohlforth quote above). While power-based perspectives identify this lag as an important feature to study, they do not
analyze either how the lag comes into existence or how it is overcome
(e.g., Schweller and Priess 1997). By the same token, from an institutionalist perspective, the issue is similarly unclear, even though the institutionalist literature points to the presence of a discrepancy between
institutions and power dynamics as a source for crisis in the system
(e.g., Ikenberry 2012). If the preeminent economic power showed
“restraint,” as these accounts suggest, it is unclear as to why when that
state is in relative decline, namely there are other rising states in the
system, there would necessarily be a signiﬁcant lag between the institutions and the distribution of power. Regardless, neither perspective
focuses on analyzing the factors that contribute to the outcome of institutions outliving power dynamics.
Third, even the institutionalist literature does not tell us how exactly
institutions matter to power dynamics (e.g., Krasner 1991).12 It seems
basic to say that institutions affect power dynamics, but once one starts
digging into the question of how institutions moderate the inter-state
distribution of power, one gets stuck in important but well-rehearsed
answers. For instance, we know that states can set aside concerns for
short-term gains and cooperate under the shadow of the future that
institutions create. In this sense, we know that power does not blind
state actors to creating a rules-based order that will serve their longterm interest. However, the institutionalist literature does not tell us
how exactly institutions moderate or mediate inter-state power asymmetries. While part of this literature refers to asymmetries among states as
an important factor to examine in multilateral institutions, it does not
provide systematic and clear answers to the question of how the interstate distribution of power relates to members’ formal political power in
institutions (e.g., Koremenos et al. 2001a, 2001b). Overall, prevalent
literatures that focus on institutions and power treat these phenomena
as separate realms, but leave their intersection under-analyzed.
This book not only borrows from, but also expands upon, these existing
perspectives as well as others to show that the institutional setting
12

Krasner, though, shows the opposite: how power might matter to institutional dynamics,
not the other way around.
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determines the signiﬁcance of the underlying distribution of economic
power. Institutions sometimes provide a relatively strong manifestation of
the inter-state distribution of economic power, while at other times they
mitigate that distribution. Taking the rise of China as an example, some
institutional settings will be relatively more responsive to China’s increasing importance in the global economy, while other institutional settings
will be more immune to this shift in the inter-state distribution of
economic power. Just as a dial on a sound system would adjust the
volume, the institution adjusts the importance of inter-state asymmetries
in economic power. The institution affects both how and how fast the
shifts in the distribution of economic power manifest themselves as
changes in member states’ formal political power. For the remainder of
the book, as shorthand, I refer to the book’s analytical framework as the
adjusted power approach.13
The book argues that institutional settings adjust power in three
primary ways. First, the institutionally dominant states’ core interpretation of the purposes and functions of multilateral institutions impacts
their preferences toward the distribution of formal political power within
these institutions.14 Different states might have different interpretations
of which (public) goods the institutions should provide, or they might
have different priorities regarding the provision of various goods that the
institution intends to supply. For instance, should the World Bank serve
the poorest states only, or should it continue to serve the middle-income
countries also? In turn, these interpretations inﬂuence states’ attitudes
toward the distribution of political power within institutions. Further,
conﬂicts between different states’ conceptualizations of institutional
priorities can shape institutional outcomes, including the distribution of
members’ formal political power.15
Second, how members fund an institution, particularly the degree and
the nature of state funding, affects the importance of the underlying interstate distribution of economic power for the institutional context. For
instance, the World Bank’s non-concessional lending arm – the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) – raises
money on international capital markets through its issuance of triple-A
13

14

15

I do not argue this distribution of power can be precisely determined, but its general
contours – where different states roughly sit in the hierarchy of economic importance –
can be ascertained.
The answer to which states are formally the dominant states within institutions is
historically contingent. In the 2008–2010 period, there is little dispute the G5, or the
G7 states, stand as the institutionally dominant states, with the USA as the leading state
(e.g., Copelovitch 2010).
These points do not suggest there are inﬁnite possibilities in the way in which a state
might interpret the key purposes of an institution.
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rated bonds.16 In contrast, the IMF does not have the ability to raise
funds in a similar manner. How does this difference across the two
institutions play into members’ calculations about ﬁnancial burden sharing? And, how does burden sharing relate to the relationship between the
inter-state distribution of economic power and the distribution of formal
political power in multilateral economic institutions? For instance, the
nature of the institution’s funding might create an “institutional logic” for
asymmetries in formal political power.
Third, institutions mediate the importance of the inter-state distribution of economic power through institutional rules and conventions.
Simply, institutional conventions denote well-established procedures
and speciﬁc interpretations of rules for certain actions. Among the
many conventions a single institution may embody, of interest here are
those that concern formal political power, including the procedures for
altering it. Reasonably, these existing rules and conventions determine
the parameters, if not the content, of how members alter formal political
power in the institution. Particularly, such rules may, more often than
not, be a source for “incremental change” as opposed to more big-bang
alterations (e.g., Pierson 2004; Thelen and Mahoney 2010).
Given that the literature currently lacks an integrative theory/approach
to the inter-relationship between distribution of economic power and
political power within multilateral institutions, the book aims to begin
ﬁlling this gap. As the preceding discussions make clear, variation across
institutions as to how power asymmetries manifest themselves is central
to the adjusted power approach. For instance, all else being equal, in
some institutional settings, the institutionally dominant states that are in
relative economic decline will be more willing to enhance the position of
the rising states, while in other settings they might be more reluctant. This
point also helps explain the “lag” between the changes in the distribution
of economic power and shifts in members’ formal political power in
multilateral economic institutions. While the argument that “institutions
adjust power” may prima facie seem obvious, existing works, including the
inﬂuential ones discussed above, have said less about the intersection of
power and institutions and more about power or institutions as separate
realms.
The book ultimately connects distinct literatures within International
Relations. Analyses about the examination of multilateral economic
institutions and the relative rise and decline of certain states generally
remain separate within the discipline, though these matters are related.
In recent years, scholars have produced theoretically diverse work on
16

Non-concessional means the loans are at market interest rates.
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multilateral economic institutions, with a particular focus on the World
Bank and the IMF.17 The design, the structure, as well as the innerworkings of institutions constitute the core of this literature. These
works, by and large, remain analytically separate from another proliﬁc
line of research and thinking within International Relations that focuses
on the rise and decline of inﬂuential states. This line of research, essentially, examines whether existing multilateral frameworks can accommodate the rising states, and the extent to which these states seek
accommodation within it as opposed to challenging it. For instance,
John Ikenberry (2008) have argued that the current multilateral political-economic system remains historically unique in the extent and the
quality of its institutional formation with numerous “points of access”
for the rising states; therefore, arguing for the peaceful rise of China.
Others, such as Iain Johnston (2008), have shown that China can be
socialized into international institutions, suggesting thereby that such
socialization will likely lessen the chances for system-wide change. Yet,
other approaches argue for the reform of multilateral institutions to
perpetuate the projection of US power globally (e.g., Brooks and
Wohlforth 2009; Ikenberry and Wright 2008). While this literature on
rising states provides a macro-picture of the multilateral economic
institutional context, it does not engage extensively with the detailed
workings of multilateral economic institutions (and the corresponding
literature).18 Ultimately any understanding of the peaceful (or not) rise
of economic powers, as well as their behavior within a speciﬁc institutional context, demands an analysis that combines the two literatures.
The book’s focus on formal political power constitutes a critical dimension in the analysis of both multilateral economic institutions and how the
rising states will impact these institutions. Formal political power, here,
denotes a state’s voice within an institution, as expressed by the rules and
procedures of that institution. Two main components comprise formal
political power – states’ voting rights in the institution and states’ representation in the constituent organs of the institution.19 Formal political
power helps explain “control” within an institution, and control remains
one of the most fundamental aspects of understanding the design and
function of institutions (e.g., Koremenos et al. 2001a, 2001b). Formal
17
18
19

For instance, see Chwieroth (2010); Copelovitch (2010); Moschella (2010); Stone
(2011); Weaver (2008); Woods (2006).
Johnston’s book, in terms of its focus on speciﬁc institutions, is an exception here, but his
examples are drawn from the security realm.
Formal political power exists in both relatively formal and informal institutions. Formal
institutions rely more extensively on written documents and domestic ratiﬁcation procedures than informal institutions, which rely less on codiﬁcation (Lipson 1991; Chapter 7).
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political power thus illustrates the “outer structural constraint” within
which the institution work (Woods 2006, p. 4).20
Member states pay close attention to their formal political power within
institutions. For instance, as one expert notes regarding the IMF, states
have “a keen awareness that any change in the quota structure [which
determines voting power] might affect their proportionate inﬂuence over
the Fund’s decision-taking and their ranking vis-à-vis other members”
(Lister 1984, p. 76; see also Woods 2000). In the 1990s, Japan’s efforts to
enhance its position to the second largest shareholder in the IMF was
marked by both Japanese insistence on this ranking and the British and
French sensitivity to being surpassed by Japan (Rapkin et al. 1997). Due
to a similar concern for rankings, since 1990, the UK and France have
requested to tie their voting power in the IMF.21 Formal political power
is, similarly, sensitive in the World Bank. In fact, during changes to
shareholding (thus voting power) the Bank permits members to exercise
their “preemptive right.” In cases where only a certain group of members
stand to beneﬁt from gains to their shares, the non-beneﬁciary members
can preemptively increase their own shares so as to preserve their ranking
in the institution.
Formal political power also tends to be a source of “prestige among
peers” or even national pride, which again explains member states’ close
scrutiny of it (Boughton 2001, p. 857; see also Chapter 4).22 For instance,
in the 1980s, China’s request to increase its capital subscription in the
World Bank intended to bring its position, particularly voting power, in
the institution “to a size which would be representative of China’s position among nations” (IMF 1987, p. 11). Further emphasizing the importance of formal position in the institution from a ranking and prestige
perspective, twenty-one members of the institution exercised their preemptive rights for the sake of the maintenance of their relative position in
response to China’s request.
Given the various ways in which formal political power matters,
domestic ratiﬁcation agencies that appropriate the funds to multilateral
institutions, such as the US Congress, tend to closely scrutinize members’ institutional standing (Lavelle 2011; Chapters 4, 5). For instance,
a US Senate Committee report that analyzed the multilateral ﬁnancial
institutions from 2003 to 2010 puts it simply: “U.S. voting shares
20
21
22

While it may not be sufﬁcient to analyze formal political power, it is necessary.
Ofﬁcially, since the Ninth General Review (1990), they have requested to have the same
quota in the institution, which means they hold the same voting power.
For a general discussion of states’ concerns with their relative positions in international
institutions due to concerns about prestige, among other aims, see Lake (2013);
Ikenberry and Wright (2008).
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and veto authority should be maintained [in the IMF and the World
Bank]” and that the position of the USA “helps maintain domestic
support for the institution” (US Senate 2010, p. 4). The importance
of formal political power for domestic ratiﬁcation bodies compounds
the importance of analyzing it (e.g., Putnam 1988; see also Chapter 3).
Even when members do not resort to formal procedures, formal political power impacts outcomes. For instance, the IMF and the World
Bank’s Executive Boards tend to reach decisions by consensus.
However, consensus does not mean equal input. Rather, consensus suggests “a position supported by executive directors having sufﬁcient votes
to carry the question if a vote were taken” (Gold 1972, p. 198). And, “[a]t
no time has the avoidance of voting connoted a dismissal of interest in
voting power” in the two international ﬁnancial institutions (p. 216; see
also Boughton 2001, e.g., p. xxi). Regarding consensus in the IMF, Pauly
(1997, p. 113) similarly notes: “everyone knows the way votes would
come out if they had to be taken.”23 In short, formal political power is a
critical factor in explaining both the (re)design of institutions and how
they function.
In addition to exploring a critical dimension of institutional design and
functioning, this book explores several empirical puzzles that the literature has largely ignored. In Chapter 3, I use an original dataset to analyze
IMF quota changes over 1965–2010, showing US inﬂuence over these
quota adjustments.24 The literature has not systematically studied the
determinants of IMF quotas, which on paper appear to be reasonably
clear, as there is a quota formula with a number of economic indicators.
The actual determinants of a member’s quota, however, deserve discussion. For one, there were numerous formulae until 2008, and there was
lack of transparency regarding which formula was used for which country.
Further, the member states politically negotiate the actual quotas. Room
for such political negotiation raises questions about whether the institutionally dominant states can exert informal inﬂuence. While scholars have
explored US informal inﬂuence over matters where member states have
delegated tasks to the IMF staff, such as loans, US inﬂuence over quota
adjustments has not yet been studied. Chapter 3’s ﬁnding that politicaleconomic proximity to the USA enhances a member’s quota shift is, thus,
signiﬁcant.

23

24

By the same token, the voting equality at the World Trade Organization, where decisions
are made by consensus, has also been consequential, particularly for the launching of new
rounds (e.g., Steinberg 2002).
IMF quotas determine members’ maximum ﬁnancial contributions to the institutions
and thereby the bulk of their voting power. See also footnote 5.
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Another relatively under-explored question the book examines is the
origins of the multilateral trading system and the failed International
Trade Organization (ITO). Chapter 4 probes why the US actors and
their interlocutors created the multilateral trading system with voting
equality, unlike the weighted voting system in the IMF and the World
Bank. As the preeminent economic power at the creation of all three
institutions, why did the USA agree to voting equality in the trade institution? This question has received little attention in the literature.
Finally, there is still very little scholarly analysis of the 2008–2010
changes in members’ formal political power in the IMF, the World
Bank, and the upgrade of the G20.25 Among these changes, in 2008 the
IMF revised its formula for determining member states’ ﬁnancial contributions (and thus the bulk of their voting power) within the institution,
and for the ﬁrst time moved to a single formula for all members. In 2010,
the World Bank, also for the ﬁrst time in its history, generated its own
formula for determining members’ shares, parting with its tradition of
mostly relying on the IMF quota formula. These 2008–2010 shifts in the
IMF and the World Bank constitute, disputably, the most extensive
changes to the rules and conventions governing formal political power.26
To my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst book on these recent shifts in formal
political power at these multilateral economic institutions. While some
might argue that a link between the rise of large emerging economies
and the 2008–2010 changes at these three multilateral economic institutions (IMF, World Bank, G20) is self-evident, the nature of that link and
how it differs across the three institutions demands detailed analysis. It
also provides a great opportunity to explore the relationship between
economic and political power. Further, the nascent literature that exists
on these 2008–2010 shifts does not provide a cross-institutional, comparative analysis of the kind this book provides.27 The detailed analysis of
these changes contributes signiﬁcantly not just to the analysis of how
shifts in the inter-state economic power affect multilateral economic
institutions, but also to charting the trajectory of these institutions.
Leading scholars have identiﬁed a need for the kind of analysis this
book provides in order to advance our understanding of international
political economic relations. For instance, Robert Keohane (2009, p. 34)
25

26
27

Exceptions include: Kaya (2012); Lesage et al. (2013); Wade (2011); Woods (2010).
The transition from the G7 to the G20 has produced an extensive literature, but I argue
this literature has generally not studied the G20’s institutional features comprehensively
(Chapter 7).
At the time of writing, some members are still in the process of implementing some of
these agreed-upon reforms.
While Wade (2011) talks about both the IMF and the World Bank, he does not analyze
them in a comparative manner.
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has noted that the discipline of international political economy (IPE) is
“remarkably reluctant to focus on major changes taking place in world
politics,” such as the impressive economic development happening in
China and its wider repercussions for international political economy
(see also Mosley and Singer 2009). And he is not alone among prominent
International Relations scholars critiquing IPE’s increasing distance from
crucial events unfolding in the global economy (e.g., Aggarwal 2010;
Cohen 2010). The book’s focus on the 2008–2010 shifts in members’
formal political power in central multilateral economic institutions
addresses these calls.28 Another line of recent criticism comes from
Drezner and McNamara (2013, p. 156), who identify the sidelining of
power as one of the critical shortcomings of the current literature: “By
bracketing the international elements of the political economy, and by
excluding power and social dynamics in favor of economic analysis of
preferences, conventional IPE has severely limited our ability to understand and interpret both the political sources and impact of phenomena.”
This book, in contrast, centralizes the study of institutional design and its
adaptation in the face of a (changing) distribution of economic power.
The methods and sources
In focusing on the distribution of formal political power in multilateral
economic institutions, and how that distribution relates to the underlying
distribution of economic power, I use both case study methodology and
quantitative approaches.
First, the cases chosen allow for a comprehensive examination of the
relationship between the inter-state distribution of economic power and
member states’ formal political power in the most critical multilateral
economic institutions. The two historical cases focus on the IMF, the
World Bank, and the International Trade Organization (ITO) – the three
integral multilateral economic institutions created at the end of the war.29
These cases provide an examination of the core question in a direct way:
why were these institutions planned with different rules for member state
representation? The two international ﬁnancial institutions embodied
weighted voting, while the ITO embraced voting equality. While the
origins of these institutions and the US leadership in creating them has
been a prevalent concern in the literature, existing works have not
28
29

Mosley and Singer (2009) speciﬁcally call for an analysis of the 2008–2010 changes in the
economic institutions studied in this book.
I analyze the IMF and the World Bank together. The ITO is a failed institution, but the
surviving trade institution, the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, was planned as
a part of the ITO (Chapter 4).
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adequately analyzed the US actors’ expressed preferences regarding the
distribution of formal political power in these institutions and the relevant
inter-state negotiations on them.
The three contemporary cases constitute the most prominent cases of
shifts to member states’ formal political power in multilateral economic
institutions – the IMF, the World Bank, and the G20.30 Analyzing the
instances of adjustments to member states’ formal political power is
necessary to being able to ascertain the inter-relationship between shifts
in inter-state economic power and states’ formal political power at multilateral economic institutions.31 These cases are particularly suited to the
purposes of this book, as they reveal institutional responses to the relative
economic decline of the institutionally dominant members (the large
advanced economies) and the rise of large emerging economies, which
has been occurring over the last several decades (e.g., Canuto and Lin
2010; Layne 2009; Chapter 5). Examining the variation between the
economic shifts, on one hand, and their institutional implications for
formal political power, on the other, directly facilitates the core purpose
of this book.
As these points suggest, within each time period, the inter-state
distribution of economic power can be treated as the same across
institutions. Put differently, within each period, the analysis “controls
for” the distribution of economic power in understanding why that
distribution manifests itself in varying degrees across different
institutions.
First, beyond providing an analysis of the adjusted power approach in
different time periods, the inclusion of both historical and contemporary
cases enriches the analysis of the relationship between economic and
political power. Understanding the historical background in formal political asymmetries enables a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship of states’ economic power and their formal political power in
multilateral economic institutions. The historical cases also permit the
exploration of some theoretical propositions in depth by tracing actual
events. As an example, while a strand of the rational choice literature on
30

31

Beyond centrality of the IMF and the World Bank to the governance of the global
economy (e.g., Drezner 2012), they are the only ﬁnancial institutions that boast nearly
universal membership. The G20 case is prominent because it led to the sidelining of the
G7, another central governing body, and facilitated reform of other institutions, particularly the Financial Stability Forum (FSB).
Here, if the dependent variable was “reform” or “change,” then selecting based on the
dependent variable might have been a concern, but the dependent variable is the distribution of formal political power in multilateral economic institutions, and the central
aim is to analyze how shifts in them relate to changes in the underlying distribution of
economic power.
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multilateral institutions, the rational design theory, identiﬁes voting rules
as a key dimension of institutional design, it leaves it under-analyzed
(Koremenos et al. 2001a, 2001b; see Chapter 2).32
Second, the cases chosen allow the analysis to be focused on a
distinct number of select variables because the institutions under
study are economic inter-governmental organizations. Put differently,
focusing on similar institutions reduces the potential pitfalls of
having to consider the impact of variables that would stem from
analyzing different types of institutions. For example, the Financial
Stability Board (FSB) also experienced changes to members’ formal
political power during the 2008–2010 period, but this change to the
FSB resulted directly from the changes to the G20 and, importantly,
the FSB is not a “substantial inter-governmental organization” and
has non-state actors as members (Grifﬁth-Jones et al. 2010, p. 7;
Chapter 7). While extensions to this book could examine more
institutions, here investigating the shifts in members’ formal political
power only in central economic inter-governmental institutions
avoids other methodological issues that could arise from examining
inter-governmental versus hybrid institutions.
Third, while the G20, which constitutes the focus of the ﬁnal case
study, is a relatively informal inter-governmental institution in comparison to the other institutions examined, its inclusion in the book serves a
critical purpose beyond analyzing crucial shifts in the current global
economic order. Although the 2008–2010 shifts in members’ formal
political power in the IMF and the World Bank were long-drawn-out
processes and have been relatively contentious, a number of rich country
leaders upgraded the existing G20 from being a marginal forum for
ﬁnance ministers to a central forum for heads of state in 2008 without
demand from the rising states (Kirton 2011). This ease with which the
rich countries extended their club contrasts with the frictions in the IMF
and the World Bank. Probing the reasons for this difference and whether
the adjusted power approach’s central claim (that institutional settings
adjust the importance of the changes in the distribution of economic
power) stands in the case of the G20 strengthens the analysis.33 Overall,
the case studies, as commonly used in the literature, provide an
32

33

Koremenos et al. (2001b, p. 1060) analyze the distribution of voting in an institution as a
dependent variable labeled as “control” and state frankly that their “ﬁndings on
control . . . are sparse, so we do not claim much for them.”
While the G20 is an informal institution and the IMF and the World Bank are formal
institutions, the core variables of analysis are applicable to the G20 (see footnotes 7 and
19). Also, just as not all formal institutions are the same, not all informal institutions are
the same either, which again motivates a focus on the institutional features of the G20.
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opportunity to explore the extent to which the evidence meets the expectations of the book’s analytical framework, the adjusted power approach
(e.g., Drezner 2007; Odell 2001; Stone 2011).
In addition to case studies, the book also quantitatively investigates the
determinants of formal political power. Particularly, Chapter 3 analyzes
shifts in member states’ quotas in the IMF between 1965 and 2010, upon
which the contemporary cases examining the 2008–2010 period elaborate (Chapters 5 and 6). The quantitative examination of IMF quotas also
helps explain how individual (member state) positions have changed
within the IMF, while the rest of the book focuses on meta-trends,
marked by the relative economic decline and rise of certain states. Since
IMF quota shifts have traditionally inﬂuenced members’ shares in the
World Bank, Chapter 3’s discussions also provide a window into Bank
share adjustments.34 Aside from the explanatory statistics in Chapter 3,
throughout, the book relies on descriptive data, most of which I collected
for this study.
The book utilizes a range of documents in addition to scholarly books
and articles, including archival material on the IMF, the World Bank,
and the International Trade Organization (ITO) and other ofﬁcial
documents, including transcripts of Board meetings and speeches
from these institutions. The reliance on original documents allows the
book to provide a close-up of actors’ preferences (as they were
expressed) and traces events in detail.35 The book also beneﬁtted from
a select number of anonymous interviews with current or former IMF
and World Bank ofﬁcials. Although I do not use the evidence from the
interviews on their own, they nonetheless contributed to conﬁrming (or
otherwise) some of the points I make regarding the 2008–2010 changes
to members’ formal political power in the IMF and the World Bank as
well as the G20.
Plan of the rest of the book
The next chapter (Chapter 2) outlines the theoretical framework of the
book – the adjusted power approach. While this approach extrapolates
from existing theories, such as variants of realism and institutionalism, the
chapter also identiﬁes how the content and expectations of the theory
differ signiﬁcantly from these existing approaches.
34
35

Unfortunately, I could not formulate a complete dataset of shareholding changes in the
Bank.
One of Elster’s (1989, 2000) main criticisms of rational choice is its avoidance of in-depth
analysis and assuming rational action based on outcomes. Process tracing of this kind is
thus important in avoiding post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Swarthmore College Libraries, on 10 Sep 2019 at 14:29:58, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316343258.001

Plan of the rest of the book

17

Chapter 3 begins the historical analysis of the relationship between the
inter-state distribution of economic power and members’ formal political
power within the institutions. It demonstrates that the IMF and the
World Bank ended up with weighted voting largely because of the US
designers’ and their interlocutors’ belief that this system of voting would
best ﬁt the institutions’ intended functions and purposes. The Chapter
also details the rules and conventions regarding the changes in members’
formal political power speciﬁcally focusing on IMF quota (thus voting
power) adjustments. The manner in which the member states negotiate
these adjustments provides an opportunity for the institutionally dominant state(s) to exert inﬂuence. To explore whether or not this potential
for inﬂuence has indeed materialized, the chapter examines members’
quota increases in 1965–2010. The evidence demonstrates that an
increase in the member state’s volume of bilateral trade with the USA
boosts the increases a member receives to its quota. Overall, Chapter 3
outlines the origins of formal political asymmetries within the IMF and
the World Bank and sheds light onto the determinants of individual
member quotas.
Chapter 4 provides a follow-up to Chapter 3 in asking why the multilateral trading system was created with voting equality, when the two
international ﬁnancial institutions preceding it were not. As the chapter
shows, the voting differences across the three institutions cannot be
dismissed easily because the US ofﬁcials ﬂoated a proposal for weighted
voting during the inter-state negotiations on the ITO. In explaining
voting equality at the ITO, two immediate answers deeply rooted in
International Relations literatures come to mind: (1) the trading institution was created three years after the ﬁnancial institutions, when the Cold
War was beginning, which raises questions about whether the onset of the
Cold War had something to do with voting equality; (2) the USA had to
signal “restraint” by relying on voting equality. Differing from these
explanations, the chapter argues that the voting equality in the multilateral trading system can primarily be explained with reference to the US
designers’ conceptualization of the institution. Interestingly, contrary to
the expectations of “two-level games,” the US negotiators pursued their
vision, even when domestically key groups, which would ratify the ITO
agreement, contested that vision. In the end, the chapter researches a
relatively under-analyzed issue on formal political asymmetries within
multilateral economic institutions, while providing support for the
adjusted power approach and engaging with alternative theoretical
expectations.
Chapter 5 begins with a descriptive analysis of the rise of large emerging economies in the last three to four decades, which provides the
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necessary background to the contemporary cases of the book
(Prologue to Chapter 5). I label the large emerging economies as “the
rising states” and the large advanced economies as institutionally
dominant but (relatively) economically “declining states,” though the
discussions pay attention to discrepancies within these groups as well as
to the poorest states.
After this prelude to the contemporary cases, Chapter 5 proceeds to
analyze the 2008–2010 shifts in the member states’ formal political power
in the IMF. These changes were more extensive in redistributing formal
political power away from the institutionally dominant but economically
declining states (the large advanced economies) to the rising states (the
large emerging markets) than earlier reform plans had suggested.
A number of institutional factors, underlined by the adjusted power
approach, help explain this outcome of relatively extensive “accommodation.” Importantly, the declining states considered increases in the rising
states’ formal political power as essential for more effective surveillance
of these countries’ economies as well as their greater involvement in
burden-sharing the ﬁnancing of the institution. The manner in which
the member states fund the IMF affected the content as well as the timing
of the 2008–2010 changes. The institution relies heavily on state ﬁnancing, whether through quotas or loans, with little ability to raise capital on
its own. Further, the chapter shows that existing institutional conventions
on the adjustment of formal political power help understand the process
of change and its incremental nature.
Chapter 6 examines the 2008–2010 shifts to member states’ formal
political power in the World Bank. Both in comparison to earlier reform
discussions at the Bank and in comparison to the IMF, these shifts were
relatively less extensive in distributing formal political power toward the
rising states. This outcome of “limited accommodation” can partially be
explained with reference to the tensions between the rising and the
declining states regarding the role the latter (should) play in the provision
of the institution’s intended global good of economic development.
Speciﬁcally, the former would like to see the Bank as serving increasingly
only its poorest members, thereby discouraging the rising states from
relying on the institution’s non-concessional resources. In this context,
greater position enhancement by the rising states would only increase the
ease with which these members could rely on the IBRD’s relatively
inexpensive loans. Further, for various reasons, the burden-sharing rationale was relatively muted at the World Bank. At the same time, the Bank’s
institutional conventions, particularly its tradition of following IMF shifts
in quota, limited the possibilities for change in the Bank as well as affecting the nature of the shifts in members’ formal political power. Finally,
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even though the Bank’s mission is multilateral economic development,
and thus low-income countries play a crucial role in whether or not the
Bank succeeds in its mission, the low-income countries made only minor
gains through the 2008–2010 reforms. This last point further supports
the adjusted power approach’s contention that a mere focus on institutional purposes would not adequately help explain the 2008–2010
changes, just as a sole emphasis on power dynamics among core states
would not sufﬁce either.
Chapter 7 examines the 2008 upgrade of the G20, which seemingly
poses a puzzle to the adjusted power approach. While much of the book,
particularly the 2008–2010 shifts in the IMF and the World Bank,
show that the declining states’ accommodation of the rising states was a
contentious process, where the declining states aimed for limited accommodation at varying degrees, the G20 case does not display the same level
of contention. In the case of the G20, in 2008, a number of leaders from
the large advanced economies extended their club to the rising states by
upgrading an existing forum (G20 gatherings of ﬁnance ministers to G20
summits of heads of state) and consolidated this upgrade by subsequently
relying on the revamped G20. Further, the G20 relies on relatively
egalitarian decision-making procedures, giving its members equal formal
political power. Hence, the accommodation in this case can be identiﬁed
as both discretionary and extensive. Why was accommodation relatively
more contentious in the IMF and the World Bank, but discretionary and
extensive in the G20? The chapter argues that the core institutional
features and functions of the G20 as an informal, “delegatory” institution
explain the different nature of accommodation in the G20. The G20
delegates tasks to other institutions and does not itself execute on them.
This particular informality, in turn, makes differentials in states’
formal political power within the institution relatively less important,
contributing to the understanding of the nature of the declining states’
accommodation.
Chapter 8 concludes by discussing the broad implications of the
book, further locating it vis-à-vis existing arguments and frameworks.
It highlights the relevance of the book for understanding the governance
of the global economy through multilateral economic institutions. For
instance, the book shows the difﬁculty in narrowing the perceived gap
between the shifts in the distribution of inter-state economic power and
the members’ formal political power in multilateral economic institutions. Even a crisis that is perceived to be monumental, such as the 2008
global economic crisis, did not alter existing institutional practices to
the point of allowing radical change. Rather, the institutions adjusted
the importance of the crisis, just as they mediated the signiﬁcance of the
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underlying distribution of economic power. At the same time, the
book’s discussions of the 2008–2010 shifts in formal political power
demonstrate the tensions between the key actors – the economically
rising and declining states – that remain under-addressed. In this
respect, the concluding chapter shows that while the 2008–2010
changes reveal the revival of the existing multilateral institutions, they
also elucidate their potential sources of weakness.
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